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Abstract: This paper explores privacy problems stemming from search behavior
conducted using public search engines. Specifically, it exposes problems related to
unintentional information leakage through a vanity search, which is a search for
information about oneself This article begins by discussing recent events that have
made this problem extremely salient. It introduces a number of existing
technologies, such as Tor and TrackMeNot, which aim to protect users' privacy
online and explains how each of these programs fails to protect users against the
specific risks related to self-search. This article highlights the inherent information
asymmetry in the relationship between search engines and their users that makes it
almost impossible to create cover traffic good enough for privacy-desiring users to
blend their own searches into. The article concludes by exploring other avenues for
protecting user privacy online.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 4, 2006, America Online, Inc. (AOL) publicly released
the search records of 650,000 of its users. The stated goal of this
release was to aid the research community at large.' In an effort to
protect user privacy, the records were "pseudonymized" by replacing
each individual customer's account I.D. and computer network address
with unique random numbers. While this severed the connection
between the search records and AOL account information, such as a
user's name and address, the ability to link an individual's searches
over multiple sessions remained the same. Almost a quarter of all
Internet users engage in the common practice of searching for their
own name or online nickname (which can include an email address,
instant messenger ID, or MySpace address) on the Internet.2 Due to
this behavior, often called a vanity search or self-Googling,3 it was
possible for journalists from The New York Times to reveal the
identity of user 4417749 to be Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow
from Lilburn, Georgia. This discovery was made by linking together
all of her vanity searches contained in AOL's pseudonymized records.
Court papers filed on January 18, 2006 by the U.S. Department of
Justice revealed that Google refused to cooperate with a previous
year's subpoena for user search records. Data requested included one
million randomly indexed webpage addresses and records for all
searches performed during a one-week period. In its refusal, Google
cited the privacy rights of its customers and the risk of revealing
1 Dawn Kawamoto, "AOL Apologizes for Release of User Search Data," CNETNews.com,
August 7, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1030_3-6102793.html (accessed November 8,
2007).
2 Deborah Fallows, "Search Engine Users," Pew Internet & American Life Project (2005):
1-2, http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPSearchengineusers.pdf (accessed November 8,
2007).
3 Daniel Dasey, "A Quick Self-Google Once a Day to Guard Your Reputation," Sydney
Morning Herald, May 23, 2004, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/22/
1085176043551 .html (accessed November 8, 2007).
4 Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr., "A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749,"
New York Times, August 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html
(accessed November 8, 2007).
5 See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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company trade secrets.6 Lawyers from the Department of Justice
argued that they needed the information to prepare their defense of the
1998 Child Online Protection Act, a law that the courts had previously
struck down, stating that it was too broad and had the potential to
prevent adults from accessing legal pornography sites. Both Yahoo
and MSN silently complied with the request, and if Google had not
publicly refused to do so, it is likely that the subpoenaed information
would have been handed over without public notification.
When testifying in front of a U.S. Senate panel on September 19,
2006, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales urged the Senate to
pass legislation requiring Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to keep two
years' worth of detailed log data on their customers' online browsing
habits.7 He stated that the growing threat of child pornography made it
necessary to keep such information for subsequent law enforcement
investigations.
8
Search engine logs are increasingly being sought in other cases. In
one case, a murder suspect's search records were produced in court to
prove that he had searched for the words "neck," "snap," and "break"
before killing his wife. 9 Others have speculated that it is only a matter
of time before search records are subpoenaed in civil cases, including
divorces.10
6 Declan McCullagh, "Google, Feds Face Off Over Search Records," CNETNews.com, March
14, 2006, http://news.com.com/Google,+feds+face+off+over+search+records/2100-1028_3-
6049262.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
7 Alberto Gonzales, "Combating Child Pornography by Eliminating Pornographers' Access to
the Financial Payment System," (Statement before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, September 19, 2006) http://banking.senate.gov/_files/gonzales.pdf
(accessed November 8, 2007).
8 "Gonzales Wants New Web Rules," CBS News, September 19, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/19/politics/main2023209.shtml (accessed November
8, 2007).
9 Julia Lewis, "Petrick Googled 'Neck,' 'Snap,' Among Other Words, Prosecutor Says,'"
WRAL News, November 13, 2005, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/121729/ (accessed
November 8, 2007).
10 Declan McCullagh, "FAQ: When Google is Not Your Friend," CNETNews.com, February
3, 2006, http://news.com.com/FAQ+When+Google+is+not+your+friend/2100-1025_3-
6034666.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
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II. PROTECTING PRIVACY ONLINE
Shortly after the AOL search records were released, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) released a set of recommended best
practices for safe search behavior on the Internet. 11 These include:
" Do not put personally identifying information in your search
terms;
" Do not use your ISP's search engine;
" Do not login to your search engine or related tools;
" Block "cookies" from your search engine;
* Vary your Internet Protocol (IP) address;
" Use web proxies and anonymizing software, such as Tor.1
2
While its first piece of advice is never to search for information on
oneself, the EFF seems to accept that even though conducting vanity
searches may be risky, people will do them anyway.' 3 The EFF
suggests that such users should heed the rest of its advice, or at the
least, run those sensitive searches from another computer than the one
used for normal search activity. 14
This article argues that certain terms placed together in a search
log, even without identifying information such as an IP address,
cookie, or user account, still reveal far too much information about the
user. There is a considerable difference between surfing the Internet
privately (such as by using Tor to keep the network address of your
computer hidden from the websites you visit) and not revealing your
identity through your search behavior. Had the AOL customers who
were identified turned off their cookies and used an anonymizing
proxy such as Tor, it is extremely unlikely that The New York Times
would have been able to link together their individual, non-vanity
11 Peter Eckersley and others, "Six Tips to Protect Your Online Search Privacy," Electronic
Frontier Foundation, 2006, http://www.eff.org/wp/six-tips-protect-your-search-privacy
(accessed November 8, 2007).
12 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson, "Tor: The Second-Generation
Onion Router," in Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium (San Diego, CA:
USENIX, 2004) http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/full_papers/dingledine/
dingledine.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007).
13 Eckersley and others, "Six Tips to Protect Your Online Search Privacy."
14 Ibid.
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searches from the released log data. The analysis of the search logs
would reveal the fact that someone was searching for "Britney
Spears," but the identity of that someone would remain secret.
Some search terms are so sensitive that their mere presence in logs
is likely to cause alarm to the user. Examples of this type of query
may include the combination of a user's name or online nickname with
terms such as "HIV," "rape, .... sexual harassment," "sex offender," and
"homosexual." After-the-fact analysis of search logs will not confirm
that the subject of the sensitive search query was also the person
issuing the search. Nevertheless, the mere fact that someone was
looking for such combinations is interesting and extremely sensitive in
and of itself.
III. A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE ADVERTISING BUSINESS
The major search engines depend upon advertising for their
revenue. Google provides free email, free wireless Internet access,'
5
and mobile phone-based GPS mapping services, 16 all so that it can
offer targeted advertisements to customers most likely to respond to
the ads. If Google can build a higher-quality data set of customer
information, it can charge more per advertisement, while also gaining
a significant market advantage over other search engines.
Some have claimed that loss of privacy on the Internet has allowed
merchants to perform more effective price discrimination because it
allows them to determine exactly how much each customer is willing
to pay for a product. 17  While Google's search engine and email
products are clear market leaders in terms of quality and functionality,
users are not given the choice between a subscription charging (yet
privacy preserving) model and the more common advertising
supported (and privacy denying) model. Instead users are given the
binary choice of either using the products, with the advertisements and
potential intrusions into their privacy, or not using them at all. If users
wish to attempt to preserve their privacy and avoid advertising, they
must take matters into their own hands. They cannot ask the search
15 Google WiFi, "Google WiFi Mountain View," https://wifi.google.corn/support (accessed
November 8, 2007).
16 Alex Medina, "Get Lost!," Official Google Blog, November 9, 2006,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/1 1/get-lost.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
17 Andrew Odlyzko, "Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet," July 27,
2003, http://www.dtc.un.edu/publications/reports/2003_13.pdf (accessed November 8,
2007).
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engines to take care of this for them, nor can they financially
compensate the search engines for the potential lost revenue due to the
loss of accurate user data.
Users have struck a Faustian bargain of sorts with the major search
engines. They seem to be willing to put up with advertising and a
wholesale loss of privacy, assuming that they are even aware that it is
happening, for free access to the services that search engines offer.
Just as a generation of American college students have shared their
personal financial data with credit card companies in order to get a free
t-shirt or pizza, 18 Internet users seem to be engaged in a similar mass
exchange of their personal information for access to accurate search
results.
Most Internet users place blind trust in search engines to present
only the best or most accurate, unbiased results. 19 In the vast majority
of cases, users are not seeking out advertisements when they go to a
search engine. They are instead trying to locate the results that most
accurately match their search query. Three out of five searchers do not
realize that search engines are compensated for some of the results in
their listings, 20 but only one in six Internet users are able to tell the
difference between paid advertisements and unbiased search results.
Thus, the line between paid advertisements and genuine search results
can be extremely blurry, and some search engines take advantage of
this feature to increase the click-through rate of their advertisements.
2 1
The search engines must be very careful to ensure that
advertisements do not become too intrusive or disruptive. In
particular, flash-based or JavaScript advertisements that take control of
a user's screen can be irritating enough that some users seek ways to
disable them.22  Pop-up advertisements have proven to be annoying
is Lynn O'Shaughnessy, "Credit Cards Offer College Students Early Danger Lesson," San
Diego Union-Tribune, September 24, 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20060924/newslzlb24oshaugh.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
19 Leslie Marable, "False Oracles: Consumer Reaction to Learning the Truth About How
Search Engines Work: Results of an Ethnographic Study," Consumer Web Watch, June 30,
2003, http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/false-oracles.pdf (accessed November 8,
2007).
20 Ibid.
21 Associated Press, "Users Confuse Search Results, Ads," Wired News, January 23, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,66374,00.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
22 Tom Spring, "Net Watchdog: The Most Annoying Online Ads," PC World, September 26,
2006, http://pcworld.com/article/id, I27207-page,I -c,topics/article.html (accessed November
8, 2007).
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enough that over 80% of users with high-speed Internet connections
now employ technology to block them - a 100% increase during the
past two years.2 3  Even Google's relatively unobtrusive text-based
advertising has inspired a number of avoidance technologies. 24 Savvy
people have been using technologies that allow them to skip
advertisements for a number of years. Use of such programs by a tiny
percentage of users does not have a significant or even measurable
impact upon the search engines' revenue. However, consider the cases
of television advertisement skipping with ReplayTV/Tivo and the P2P
file-sharing technologies made mainstream by Napster. When this
kind of easy-to-use technology enables an average user to bypass the
copyright/advertising systems in place, it threatens to destabilize the
entire business model upon which companies' revenue streams are
built.
Google would no doubt prefer that each user sign in to one of the
company's services before searching. In such cases, Google is able to
collect far more data to link searches, advertising clicks, and browsing
habits with an individual person across multiple sessions and from
different computers. Likewise, simply letting Google store a persistent
cookie on one's computer allows the company to achieve its goals,
albeit with a significantly lower quality of user data. It is not
surprising that each of the EFF's private searching recommendations
threaten Google's bottom line, should these measures be employed by
the masses. As of September 2006, the highest-valued search terms in
Google's AdWords advertising system are related to medical class
action lawsuits and other legal problems.25 Yet, these are the same
kinds of searches that users will likely want to protect from prying
eyes, or worse, a subpoena after the fact. One of the main goals of this
article is to highlight this relationship: that Google's ability to serve
fine-grained advertising (and thus achieve higher revenues) directly
23 Thomas Claburn, "Consumer Use of Ad-Blocking Technology Doubles," Information
Week, December 5, 2006, http://www.informationweek.com/intemet/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=1 96601694 (accessed November 8, 2007).
24 CustomizeGoogle: Improve Your Google Experience, http://www.customizegoogle.com/
(accessed November 8, 2007); Userscripts.org, "Hide Google Adsense Ads,"
http://userscripts.org/scripts/show/675 (accessed November 8, 2007).
25 John Battelle, "Highest Paying Adwords," John Battelle's Searchblog, March 26, 2006,
http://battellemedia.com/archives/002444.php (accessed November 8, 2007); Cyberwyre,
"Updated: Highest Paying AdSense Keywords," March 23, 2006,
http://www.cwire.org/2006/03/23/updated-highest-paying-adsense-keywords/ (accessed
November 8, 2007).
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competes with the methods by which a user can attempt to achieve
anonymity and preserve his or her online privacy.
IV. TRACKMENOT
Shortly after the AOL incident became public, New York
University researchers Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum
released a tool named TrackMeNot (TMN)26 that aims to protect user
search privacy. Their tool is an extension to the Firefox web browser
and initiates randomized search queries in the background to a number
of commercial search engines. These searches, issued over random
periods of time, aim to lose the user's real searches in a cloud of
"ghost queries" and as the authors describe, "significantly [increase]
the difficulty of aggregating such data into accurate or identifying user
profiles. 27
A. THE DIFFICULTY OF FAKING TRAFFIC
The current version of TMN begins only with a small seed list
taken from lists of most frequent search terms published by the search
companies. Using these terms as seeds, each TMN client dynamically
evolves its query list by parsing likely search terms from the results of
each query and swapping these back into its "Current-Query" list.28
There is very little risk to the user if someone else learns that they
are searching for the hot topic, or immensely popular search term of
the day. Any hot topic is sought by millions of other users, thus one is
unlikely to be embarrassed or suffer otherwise if searches for those
terms become public. As a concrete example, one wants privacy when
searching for information on breast cancer, but not when searching on
Britney Spears. TMN creates cover traffic, or "ghost queries" as the
authors describe them, by submitting queries to search engines
containing terms from its Current-Query list at random intervals.
The actual level of plausible deniability provided to users could
prove to be rather problematic due to the fact that users do not submit
their own legitimate queries at random intervals. They tend to send
26 Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum, "TrackMeNot,"
http://mrl.nyu.edu/-dhowe/TrackMeNot (accessed November 8, 2007).
27 Ibid.
28 Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum, "TrackMeNot FAQ,"
http://mrl.nyu.edu/-dhowe/TrackMeNot/faq.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
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multiple searches over a short period of time, followed by longer
periods of web-browsing. It should be fairly easy for the search
engine companies to focus on users' real search activity, by filtering
out all searches that match the behavior exhibited by TMN.
The major search engines have extremely accurate data on the
search frequency of various terms. Portions of this information, albeit
generalized to remove specific traffic figures, are even made public
through services like Google Trends29 and Google Zeitgeist. 30 TMN
will find itself sticking out if the search queries it issues significantly
diverge from the norm and deviate from the standard frequency of
search terms in the population at large, or even those other users in
one's geographic location. Users often do not find the information
they want from the first clicked-upon link that they reach via the
search engine. A rather limited eye-tracking study by the firm Enquiro
found that users returned to the search page and then clicked on
additional items listed by the search engine over 49% of the time.
31
This behavior, dubbed "pogo sticking," suggests that the first link
returned is often not enough to meet the user's needs. Researchers
analyzing the AOL search data have also noted a strong tendency for
people to refine their searches. If the first page of results does not
deliver what they are after, they will refine the search terms in an
effort to produce better results.
32
Google, Yahoo, and other search engines have large amounts of
accurate data for this kind of behavior and guard it carefully as a trade
secret. Due to the fact that the TMN developers do not have access to
detailed user click data, it will be exceedingly difficult for them to
attempt to accurately mimic genuine user habits with automated
searches. As a result, the TMN initiated searches will diverge from the
norm of real user behavior, making it easy for the search engines to
identify and filter out TMN's searches.
29 Google Trends, "About Google Trends," http://www.google.com/intl/en/trends/about.html
(accessed November 8, 2007).
30 Google Press Center, "Zeitgeist: Search Patterns, Trends, and Surprises,"
http://www.google.com/press/zeitgeist.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
31 Gord Hotchkiss, "Tales of Pogo Sticks, Bouncy SERPS and Sticky Pages," Search Engine
Guide, September 11, 2006, http://www.searchengineguide.com/hotchkiss/2006/
091 1_ghl.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
32 Geoffrey Faivre-Malloy, "AOL Search Data," Search Engine Optimizer Blog, August 22,
2006, http://www.seomoz.org/blog/aol-search-data (accessed November 8, 2007).
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B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Search engines such as Google monitor the click-through-rates
(CTR) of the advertisements they display in web pages containing
search results and elsewhere. Advertisements that consistently suffer
from low CTR will be punished, and in time, no longer be displayed to
the user, no matter how much the advertiser pays per click. In
attempting to mask the user's real search behavior, TMN, in fact, will
be inadvertently performing a specific kind of attack against Google's
advertisers: impression spam.
34
In addition to performing this attack, TMN will no doubt stand out
due to the fact that its ghost queries will have a 0% CTR. If the TMN
developers attempted to fix this behavior by modifying their program
to click on advertisements at random, approximating the rate of real
users, the developers would soon find themselves engaged in a
different, yet equally unfriendly, behavior with respect to Google:
mass click-fraud. Advertisers are charged each time one of their
advertisements is clicked. Thus, each phantom search and click
performed by TMN would result in a financial loss for web
advertisers.
Google's terms of service clearly state that the kind of behavior
that TMN engages in is forbidden. 35 Users may not send automated
queries of any sort to Google's system without express permission in
advance from Google. At the very least, Google would be perfectly
within its rights to terminate the accounts of customers who install
36TMN. Given that one can use Google's search engine without an
account, this account termination is probably not a problem for the
vast majority of Internet users. However, for those eight-million-plus
Gmail users who have entrusted Google with their email data being
kicked off the service could prove to be extremely detrimental. 37
33 Google AdWords, "Learning Center," http://www.google.com/adwords/
learningcenter/text/18754.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
34 Rob McGann, "Impression Spam Worries Google Advertisers," ClickZ News, February 24,
2005, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3485386 (accessed November 8, 2007).
35 Google Privacy Center, "Google Terms of Service for Your Personal Use,"
http://www.google.con/terms-of service.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
36 Ibid.
37 Saul Hansell, "In the Race with Google, It's Consistency vs. the 'Wow' Factor," New York
Times, July 24, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/24/technology/24yahoo.html
(accessed November 8, 2007).
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The legality of TMN's techniques is not clear, and use of it and
similar tools may expose users to legal risks.38  The tort claim of
"trespass to chattel" has been successfully used by service providers
against unwanted, automated, resource-hogging Internet tools in the
past.39 While the laws surrounding click-fraud are not yet mature,
Google has brought a number of cases to trial against people for
attempting to defraud their AdSense advertising system.40  The legal
issues that surround TMN's behavior are beyond the scope of this
paper, although they merit thorough analysis. Researching them is left
as an exercise to the legally-inclined reader.
C. THE LACK OF A FEEDBACK Loop
One of the major problems for TMN's developers may be that it is
difficult for them to measure their success. The major search engines
have very little incentive to share information with TMVN. If the search
engines are indeed able to detect the presence of TMN, or worse, filter
out the automated searches from legitimate queries, TMN's authors
and users will never know. Google and others will be able to
successfully use this data, and potentially gain even more value from
it, with the knowledge that it is data that users value enough to go out
of their way to protect. Needless to say, if the National Security
Agency or some other government agency were to obtain Google's log
data, they could also perform the same analysis, silently, of course.
38 The additional overhead of a single copy of TMN running on a user's computer would not
cause a noticeable increase in the resources required for Google to respond to the ghost
queries. However, the collective effect of 20,000 copies of TMN running on thousands of
different computers could potentially impair the regular functioning of Google's servers. The
legal implications of this, and in particular, who Google could go after (individual TMN users,
or the developers of the system) are unclear.
39 Pamela Samuelson, "Unsolicited Communications as Trespass?" Communications of the
ACM 46, no. 10 (2003): 15-20, http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/
acmvo146_p 15.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007); Dan L. Burk, "The Trouble with
Trespass," J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L., 3 (2000): 27, http://www.isc.umn.edu/research/
papers/trespass-ed2.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007).
40 Ben Elgin, "The Vanishing Click-Fraud Case," Business Week, December 4, 2006,
http://businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2006/tc2006l204_923336.htm?chan=-technol
ogytechnology+index+pagemore+of+todayO/o2-7s+top+stories (accessed November 8,
2007); Davis A. Vise, "Clicking to Steal," Washington Post, April 17, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58268-2005Aprl 6.html (accessed
November 8, 2007).
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The absence of a feedback loop will make it extremely difficult for
the TMN creators to evolve their technology, as they will be denied
knowledge of which particular behavior allows their program to be
identified. If TMN is widely adopted and actually becomes a
significant burden on the search engines' network resources, the search
engines may have to adopt a more active approach by banning users of
the product. In the past, Google has blocked technologies such as Tor
when known Tor IP addresses were submitting too many queries.41 In
this case, Google offered two options to users wishing to search from a
Tor IP address: solve a CAPTCHA test,42 which requires users to type
the letters of a distorted image into a form, thus confirming that the
user is real and not a computer program; or be blocked. One can
easily imagine Google deploying a similar system for all the queries
sent by a TMN user, both automated and legitimate, if they are able to
easily detect the presence of the extension through search log analysis.
This could instantly break TMN, unless of course, users are willing to
solve a CAPTCHA for every fake search submitted by the extension, a
rather unlikely scenario.
D. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The relationship between search engines and their customers can
be seen as a classic case of information asymmetry.43  The search
engines know how often each word is searched for, how many
searches per session any one user issues on average, how much time
there is between sessions and individual searches, how many
advertisements are clicked on per session, and how often
advertisements are expected to be clicked by a given user.
Furthermore, they keep the vast majority of this information to
themselves because their competitors, those actors trying to actively
defraud them (e.g. those committing click-fraud), and those users
trying to hide their search behavior, would all love to have this data.
41 Danny Sullivan, "More on Google & Blocking Privacy Proxies," Search Engine Watch,
September 8, 2006, http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/060908-080437 (accessed
November 8, 2007).
42 Luis von Ahn and others, "CAPTCHA: Using Hard Al Problems For Security," in
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRPYT 2003: International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Berlin, 2003)
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-biglou/captcha-crypt.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007).
43 George A. Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 no. 3 (1970): 488-500,
http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v84yl 970i3p488-500.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
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It is because of this huge gap in information that technologies such
as TrackMeNot are doomed to failure. They lack accurate Internet
behavior data that is essential in helping a user mask her searches in a
cloud of effective cover traffic. Their attempts to maintain privacy
without the necessary information on what cover traffic should look
like may cause their users to stand out even more than they would if
they had not attempted to evade the watchful eyes of search engines in
the first place.
V. TOR
Tor is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and
groups to improve their privacy and security on the Internet
.... Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking
them and their family members, or to connect to news sites,
instant messaging services, or the like when these are
blocked by their local Internet providers."
Tor allows users to mask the link between their own network
activity (search behavior, web browsing, or instant messaging) and any
logs kept by webmasters, or worse, intrusive governments. Servers
receiving web requests see only a Tor exit node and are unable to learn
the actual IP addresses of the users initiating queries.
45
Use of the Tor anonymity proxy to sever the link between a user
and an identifying IP address (and in tandem, disabling cookies in the
browser) restricts the search engines' abilities to link an individual's
searches together. Users who are solely concerned with protecting
their search behavior against log analysis by the search engines do not
necessarily have to use Tor - any proxy server will work.
The list of Tor exit nodes is public, and as Google's past behavior
of selectively blocking Tor servers at times has demonstrated, Google
subscribes to this list. Presumably, if a user issues a non-common
search via a Tor server, even with cookies turned off, and then a few
minutes later issues a refined but similar search query via a different
Tor exit node, Google can link those two searches together. While the
link between the two queries is not certain, as is the case when cookies
are present, it still has the potential to reveal information that the user
44 The Tor Project, Inc., "Tor: Overview," October 24, 2007,
http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en (accessed November 8, 2007).
45 Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson, "Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router."
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expected to remain private. This technique only works for uncommon
search queries. Yet, as explained earlier in this article, these are often
the searches that users wish to protect the most.
A. WHY TOR ALONE CANNOT PROTECT VANITY SEARCHES
The combination of an anonymizing proxy, such as Tor, and a
browser session without cookies does much to protect user search
activity on the Internet, and in particular, the linking of multiple
queries during one or more sessions. As was explained earlier in this
article, a search for one's own name combined with culturally or
politically delicate terms can be extremely sensitive search
information. While Tor will deny the search engine the knowledge of
who issued the search, the mere fact that such a search was issued is
extremely valuable information, as such, and the use of Tor is not
enough to protect these kinds of queries.
While Tor does much to hide users' network information from the
websites hosting content, it introduces a number of other problems.
Nefarious Tor exit node operators have the ability to view, or worse, to
modify the data that they relay. In at least one published case,46 a
server operator placed flash-based "webbugs" into webpages served in
order to reveal the true source of the web requests. At the very least,
an exit node operator has the ability to view users' search requests.
Tor users must worry about the exit node operators keeping and later
disclosing potentially sensitive searches in addition to search engine
logging.
B. INFORMATION LEAKAGE
It is commonly accepted among computer security experts that
encrypting one's most sensitive communications is not enough, and in
fact, can be extremely dangerous. The mere act of encrypting only
sensitive messages leaks valuable information to outsiders watching
the wire. They can see there are some messages that are important
enough to try to protect. Techniques such as traffic analysis, when
employed against a user who only encrypts important messages, can
prove to be extremely effective.47 Applying this idea to the problem of
46 Andrew Christensen, "Practical Onion Hacking: Finding the Real Address of Tor Clients,"
FortConsult, 2006, http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/0610-
advisories/Practical_Onion Hacking.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007).
47 George Danezis, "Introducing Traffic Analysis: Attacks, Defences and Public Policy
Issues. . ." (lecture, 23rd Chaos Communication Congress (23C3), Berlin, Germany,
[Vol. 3:2
SOGHOIAN
sensitive searches, it is quite clear that to achieve privacy one must
apply the protection methods to all searches, and not just those that
one deems to be sensitive.
Many privacy enhancing technologies impose rather steep costs on
the user, such as lack of convenience due to the absence of cookie
tracking across sessions or in the case of Tor, a significant increase in
traffic latency as encrypted packets bounce across the globe before
they reach their final destination. While users may be willing to
tolerate this in order to gain privacy protections for sensitive searches,
they may be less willing to do so for the bulk of their less sensitive
traffic. This selective use of Tor and other technologies will
unfortunately leave users vulnerable to traffic analysis by those with
wiretap or network level access to users' communication data.
C. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND PORNOGRAPHY
It has been noted by some observers that pornography drives
technology.48 Consumers of pornography are often the early adopters
of technology and are often willing to tolerate beta quality products
that other users refuse to use. One example of this is the initial
attempts to stream video on the web. Users of adult content were the
main audience willing to accept excruciatingly slow downloads of
jittery, low quality videos. These early adopters wanted better video
quality, and their demand arguably drove the market to develop better
technology that eventually reached the masses.49
There is a notable absence of good information on the traffic that
the Tor network carries, primarily because collecting such data in the
United States could put researchers into legal jeopardy. 50 One recent
study performed outside the United States suggests that one of the
primary uses of Tor is to transfer pornographic content.5' If the
anecdotal evidence presented in this report accurately describes the
December 30, 2006) http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/-gdanezis/TAIntro.pdf (accessed
November 8, 2007).
48 Peter Johnson, "Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the Internet," FED.
Comm. L. J., 49, no. 1 (1996): 217, http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v49/no1/
johnson.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
49 Ibid.
50 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Tor: Legal FAQ for Tor Server Operators," April 25, 2005,
http://tor.eff.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
51 Christensen, "Practical Onion Hacking."
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Tor network, it is thus likely that Tor traffic has a higher porn-per-
packet ratio than "normal" Internet data. Given the assumption that a
Tor user is probably interested in adult content, Google could allow
advertisers to bid on keywords displayed to users coming from Tor
exit nodes. "Tor targeting" would surely seem valuable to
pornographic advertisers and would be a way for them to guess user
intent without knowing anything else about a market segment that
fiercely guards its privacy. This is just one example of the kind of user
data that could be inferred from the use of a privacy-preserving
system, even when encryption is used.
VI. OTHER OPTIONS
TrackMeNot and Tor are not enough to protect vanity searches.
This article now explores a few other options.
A. SEARCHING ON ENCRYPTED DATA AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
RETRIEVAL
There has been a significant amount of research into the areas of
searching on encrypted data52 and private information retrieval
(PIR).53 Search engines are focused on collecting more customer
information, not in protecting consumers' privacy. Their business
models are built on the practice of mining and exploiting user online
behavior data. Thus, while research in these areas is interesting from
an academic perspective, there is very little incentive for a service
provider to expend the significant resources required to support PIR or
52 Dawn Xiaodong Song, David Wagner, and Adrian Perrig, "Practical Techniques for
Searches on Encrypted Data," in Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society, 2000)
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-dawnsong/papers/se.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007); Dan
Boneh and others, "Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search," in Advances in Cryptology
- EUROCRYPT 2004 (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Berlin, 2004): 506-522,
http://crypto.stanford.edu/-dabo/papers/encsearch.pdf (accessed November 8, 2007); Philippe
Golle, Jessica Staddon, and Brent Waters, "Secure Conjunctive Keyword Search Over
Encrypted Data," in Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Heidelberg, Germany:
Springer-Berlin, 2004): 31-45, http://crypto.stanford.edu/-pgolle/papers/conj.pdf (accessed
November 8, 2007).
53 Amos Beimel and others, "Breaking the O(nl/(2k-1)) Barrier for Information-Theoretic
Private Information Retrieval," in Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society, 2002): 261-70; Benny Chor
and others, "Private Information Retrieval," in Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society, 1995): 41-50.
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encrypted data searching, especially given that these technologies
would hinder their primary goal of collecting customer data. The
burden of privacy protection thus falls on the user.
B. DOING THE SEARCH YOURSELF
Local searching, a surprisingly simple technique, may prove to be
extremely useful at maintaining user privacy online. For fairly
uncommon names, users can simply request every single web page
containing their name or online nickname from a search engine,
preferably, using an anonymizing proxy such as Tor. They can then
download a copy of each of these web pages to their own computer,
and perform a local search on those web pages for the sensitive terms.
This method has several shortcomings. A person with a unique
name, but a fairly major web presence, may find that there are far too
many web pages citing his or her name to download. Likewise,
someone with a common name may encounter too many false
positives when attempting to save a local copy of every page
referencing him or her. In both of these cases, a complete local search
may prove to be impossible. Finally, while most major operating
systems include the ability to search through a large number of
directories and files for one or more phrases, in many cases, it is not
easy to use. The technology required to download every instance of a
user's name from the Internet requires automation software, something
not readily available to the masses. Thus, effective local searching is
not yet an option for the vast majority of users.
Local searching lacks the bells, whistles, and ease of use that
Google and the other search engines provide. Yet, it remains far safer
in terms of user privacy than sending a sensitive vanity search out onto
the Internet.
C. PRE-ANNOUNCING YOUR STRATEGY
Technologies such as TrackMeNot pose a specific threat to the
advertising dependant search engines. Instead of merely free-riding on
Google's network and computing resources, as do those who search
without viewing ads, TMN's method of achieving anonymity has the
potential to cause significant collateral damage (via click-fraud) to
Google's advertising system by requesting web pages with
advertisements that will never be clicked. While TMN 's goals are
noble, its methods can cause unintentional harm to Google and others.
One simple technique that could solve this problem of collateral
damage would be for TMN users to disclose their intentions ahead of
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time. By marking all search requests, both genuine and automated,
with an additional argument in the query sent to Google's servers,
TMN users could significantly reduce Google's incentive to locate and
neutralize TMN traffic. 54  All queries originating from TMN users
could then be easily excluded from the advertising system. While
TMN's network activity probably will not be too difficult to
differentiate from real user traffic, this simple technique at least
reduces Google's incentive to do so. Just as webmasters can currently
include a "robots.txt" file on their websites to notify web-crawlers of
their desire to not be crawled, adding an additional flag to the search
query would be a polite and reasonable way for TM4N and other
privacy preserving systems to communicate intent to Google.
The downside to this flagging technique is that by adding the flag,
a user instantly announces himself as a TMN user. This then reduces
his anonymity set to that of all TMvN users, a small minority of all
search clients.55  Conversely, without the flag, the user could
potentially be any of Google's millions of search users. TMN's
current behavior is anything but covert, and thus, a user has probably
already reduced his anonymity set by using TMN, even if he has not
explicitly announced it.
D. BE YOUR OWN PROXY
As others have noted, anonymity loves company.56  Users gain
privacy and plausible deniability when they can blend into a large
crowd of other users. The use of TrackMeNot can be summed up as:
"Google knows who I am, but if I send enough fake queries, the
54 Something similar to this is already done for Google search queries issued via the built-in
search bar in the Firefox web browser. Such queries from the browser are tagged, so that the
search engine can later give Mozilla a cut of any advertising revenue generated by the query.
The Mozilla Corporation, which owns and develops Firefox, made over $56 million dollars in
2006 through its profit sharing arrangement with Google. See Mitchell Baker, "Beyond
Sustainability," Mitchell's Blog, October 22, 2007, http://weblogs.mozillazine.org/mitchell/
archives/2007/1 0/beyondsustainability.html (accessed November 8, 2007).
55 Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Hansen, "Anonymity, Unlinkability, Unobservability,
Pseudonymity, and Identity Management-A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology," May
29, 2006, http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/literatur/AnonTerminologyv0.28.pdf (accessed
November 8, 2007).
56 Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson, "Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and the
Network Effect," in Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on the Economics of Information
Security (Cambridge, UK: WEIS, 2006) http://freehaven.net/doc/wupss04/usability.pdf
(accessed November 8, 2007).
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company won't know which searches are real, and which are not."
Tor and other anonymizing proxies instead adopt the philosophy of "if
I can keep my network location secret from Google, then while it will
know exactly which searches are being issued, it won't know who is
initiating them." Additionally, Tor users not only reveal their search
information to Google, but also reveal it to the operator of a Tor exit
node, who might not be trustworthy. One way of avoiding this
problem of revealing search data to proxy operators is for users to run
their own Tor exit node. Typically, when using the Tor network, users
risk nefarious exit-node operators seeing their search queries. By
assuming the role of an exit-node operator and using their own exit
node for queries to Google and the other search engines, a user can
make it far more difficult for another proxy administrator to learn of
his or her search data.
57
VII. CONCLUSION
This article explored the problem of sensitive information leakage
due to vanity searches on the Internet. It highlighted the inherent
conflict of interest in the advertising/search engine business in which
Google's ability to serve fine-grained advertising (and thus achieve
higher revenues) directly competes with the methods by which users
can achieve anonymity with the goal of preserving what little is left of
their online privacy. This article also highlighted the state of
information asymmetry between the search engines and users that
makes it almost impossible to create artificial search queries that are
indistinguishable from those submitted by real users. This article
demonstrated that technologies such as TrackMeNot may increase user
exposure through their attempts to create cover traffic than if they had
not been used in the first place. Finally, this article explained how
anonymizing proxies such as Tor are not enough to protect vanity
searches. Several other potential solutions were discussed, none of
which are ideal or completely foolproof.
Effective privacy protection for vanity searches is a difficult
problem. Current privacy-preserving systems, although appearing to
solve the problem, may only exacerbate it. Existing technologies
alone cannot be trusted to provide private searching functionality to
57 The Tor Project, "Do I Get Better Anonymity if I Run a Relay? Yes, You Do Get Better
Anonymity Against Some Attacks," Tor FAQ, October 21, 2007,
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ (accessed November 8, 2007).
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users. While still an unresolved issue, future research in the area will
hopefully fill this dire need for privacy-preserving vanity searches.
